Unmanned and Manned Aircraft Autonomy
Feature Photo: Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Levels of Autonomy. Reprinted from "Automation and Autonomy in Unmanned Aircraft Systems," by Elliot & Stewart, 2011, ProQuest. Copyright 2011 by Elliot & Stewart
Levels of Autonomy
Several researchers from many backgrounds have sought to create a methodology to measure Levels of Autonomy (LoA) (Elliot & Stewart, 2011). These LoA can be broken down into levels to show how much human operators are required to assist or intervene with a system. The range for these levels ranges from 1 to 9 and 10 and above (Elliot & Stewart, 2011).
Levels of Autonomy from 1 to 3
Levels of Autonomy from 1 to 3 are considered Low LoA. These systems have very little internal Situation Awareness (SA), and human interaction is the main component for interaction and control (Elliot & Stewart, 2011). Low LoA would be similar to manned aircraft using an autopilot that simply maintains an altitude or heading.
Levels of Autonomy from 4 to 6
Levels of Autonomy from 4 to 6 are considered Mid LoA. Mid-level LoAs interact with the human operator, approximately 50% of the time (Elliot & Stewart, 2011). The human operators provide the UAS with goals or mission plans, and the UAS must try to execute these commands after the human operator has given the final approval to do so (Elliot & Stewart, 2011). The Mid-level LoAs are different from the low levels in that the operators can create a plan beforehand to have something for the UAS to execute during a flight or mission.
Levels of Autonomy from 7 to 9
Levels of Autonomy from 7 to 9 are considered High LoA. High-level LoAs have very little interaction from the human operator and do not require human approval to execute its goals (Elliot & Stewart, 2011). The UAS will perform actions and preplanned flight routes without the approval of the operator and has a great understanding of its goal with the capability to perform high-level, complex decision making (Elliot & Stewart, 2011). Regardless of the level of automation, Risk Management should always be taken into account to ensure the safe operations of the UAS.
Manned and Unmanned Considerations
I believe there is a difference between manned and unmanned operations in regard to UAS. A new human factor that has emerged from the use of unmanned systems is the absence of “Shared Fate” between the pilot and the aircraft (Clothier, 2012). The UAS operator does not feel a sense of concern for the safety of the aircraft since they are not on the aircraft in the event of an emergency. In an article by Whitlock (2014), the transcript of MQ-1 pilots during crashes demonstrates the differences in mentality when the UAS is having an emergency or crashing.
“We’re in the soup here. . . . Dude, uh, we’re not sure what the aircraft is doing. . . . Yeah, we crashed.”
Unidentified pilot of an Air Force Reaper as it crashed in Douglas County, Nev., on December 5, 2012 (Whitlock, 2014).
The quotes explain that the pilot of the aircraft knew the aircraft was in trouble and simply acknowledged that it had crashed. The actions by the crew and the concern would be different if it was a pilot inside of a manned aircraft.
The Use of Automation Today
Automation in manned aircraft has created what is considered the “Children of the Magenta” (Mingle, 2015). In the article by Mingle (2015), William Langewiesche, a former airline pilot explains that "We appear to be locked into a cycle in which automation begets the erosion of skills or the lack of skills in the first place, and this then begets more automation" (Mingle, 2015). The over-reliance on automation can create a downward trend of reliance on more automation due to the atrophy of skills that were lost because of automation, to begin with.
This downward slope can cause problems for pilots as it can potentially put pilots in a position where they forget the basics. On February 12, 2009, Colgan Flight 3407 crashed when the pilots were receiving stall indications from the aircraft's stick shaker; however, they did not respond correctly to the stall indications and subsequently crashed the aircraft (National Transportation Safety Board, C. S., & Park, A., 2010). More information can be seen in the YouTube video below.
References
Atkins, E.Emergency landing automation aids: An evaluation inspired by US airways flight 1549. () doi:10.2514/6.2010-3381
Clothier, R. A. (2012). An overview of UAS: capabilities and challenges.
Elliott, L. J., & Stewart, B. (2011). Automation and Autonomy in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (pp. 100-117). In R. K. Barnhart, S. B. Hottman, D. M. Marshall, & E. Shappee (Eds.), Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Available from https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/lib/erau/reader.action?docID=1449438&ppg=1
Martin, A. (2012, April 6). F-18 Crashes in Virginia Beach, Pilot Apologizes. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/04/f-18-crashes-virginia-beach/329604/
Mingle, K. (2015, June 26). Children of the Magenta (Automation Paradox, pt. 1). Retrieved from https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/children-of-the-magenta-automation-paradox-pt-1/
National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Loss of Thrust in Both Engines after Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River, US Airways Flight 1549, Airbus A320–214, N106US, Weehawken, New Jersey, January 15, 2009.
National Transportation Safety Board, C. S., & Park, A. (2010). Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air, Inc., operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February 12, 2009. In ACM SIGGRAPH (p. 7).
Whitlock, C. (2014, June 23). 'Stop saying 'uh-oh' while you're flying': Drone crash pilot quotes unveiled. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/23/stop-saying-uh-oh-while-youre-flying-drone-crash-pilot-quotes-unveiled/