US Army tests jamming pod on Gray Eagle drone
A Multifunction Electronic Warfare Air Large jamming pod was mounted to an MQ-1C Gray Eagle to test its capabilities during an exercise over the summer. (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems)
C4ISRNET recently released an article about the United States Army testing a jamming pod on an MQ-1C Gray Eagle in hopes have it fielded in 2022. This jamming pod will be part of the Army's reinvestment into Electronic Warfare after its divestment after the cold war. As the world increases its reliance upon the Electromagnetic Spectrum, the Department of Defense (DOD) must ensure they maintain the ability to operate in all domains while removing the adversaries' use.
The MQ-1C can be considered a low-cost attritable system. The aircraft is a similar model to the MQ-1 Predator previously flown by the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Army operates these systems independent of the U.S Air Force, though they share the same airspace over a battlefield. The ability to utilize this platform with an assumed risk of a potential loss increases the system's ability overall.
Risk
If you look at AFI 90-802, you will find:
1.2.1. Risk is inherent in all missions, operations, and activities, both on and off-duty.
1.2.2. Risk may be effectively mitigated if understood, and appropriate action is taken.
1.2.3. All personnel are responsible for utilizing RM concepts, tools, and techniques
Risk is the potential for exposure to danger. When flying in an airspace where there is a high risk, an Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR) must be found. This ALR will allow users on the battlefield to determine how much they are willing to risk the aircraft to complete the mission. This can vary based on the severity of the mission or even the potential outcome of mission failure.
Aircraft Limitations
A flaw in the use of the MQ-1C is its speed. The MQ-1C is expected to fly a top speed of 117 knots. Compared to other aircraft, this is extremely slow.
With such a slow speed for the MQ-1C, it would not do well when combined with U.S. Air Force fighter/strike aircraft. This is not the worse thing; this means that the MQ-1C should only be used when there is complete air dominance. Aircraft such as the EA-18G can keep up with fighter aircraft to provide Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities as the battlefield shifts quickly.
Another limitation is the requirement of satellite Remote Split Operations (RSO) or Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS). The MQ-1C will likely require a satellite connection, which requires protection from adversary EW capabilities. The Space Force will assist the U.S. Army in protecting the satellite systems to ensure uninterrupted access in Major Combat Operations (MCO).
Conclusion
With a low-cost attritable aircraft, the U.S. Army will have an airborne theater capability to re-task quickly, depending on the troops' requirements on the ground. The use of the system will require air dominance from an air branch such as the U.S. Air Force, Navy, or Marines. The aircraft from these branches will need to ensure no enemy air assets can remove the MQ-1C from the battlefield before it can be utilized. The risk associated with the MQ-1C is much lower than a manned aircraft since it is cheap and has no human onboard. The satellite systems will need protection from the warfighters in the U.S. Space Force to ensure uninterrupted operations.